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Has Regulatory Reform been Misdirected? 
 
 
I. Introduction 
 
The incentive for those in any institution, such as a Central Bank, is to justify and extol the virtues of 
the decisions that they have already taken.   Criticisms of current regulatory measures are more 
likely to come from outsiders, perhaps especially from academics, (with tenure), who can play the 
fool to the regulatory king.   I offer some thoughts here from that perspective.  I shall try to make 
two general arguments; first that bank regulatory failures are better addressed by governance 
reforms than by raising capital and liquidity requirements ever higher; and second that the main 
lacuna has been in allowing banks to finance illiquid long-dated property mortgages on the basis of 
short-dated, runnable, uninsured wholesale liabilities. 
 
 
II. Persons, not Inanimate Institutions, are Responsible for Decisions 
 
So, to start off, I would contend that the regulatory failures that led to the crisis and the 
shortcomings of regulation since then are largely derived from a failure to identify the persons 
responsible for bad decisions.   Banks cannot take decisions, exhibit behaviour, or have feelings—  
but individuals can.  The solution lies in reforming  the governance set-up  and realigning incentives 
faced by banks’ management.    
 
Recent regulatory problems have been greatly reinforced by a widespread tendency to apply human 
characteristics, i.e. to anthropomorphise, to an inanimate institute, in this case a bank.  We tend to 
talk about Bank X having assumed too much leverage, or having behaved in an improper fashion—
rather than management of Bank X did such and such; We say that Bank X got bailed out rather than 
the creditors and clients of Bank X got bailed out.   
 
The outcome has been a regulatory system primarily based on imposing a structure of regulations on 
banks, with insufficient concern about the incentives on bankers to adjust to, and to ‘game’, that 
system.  By the same token there has been insufficient concern for reform of the incentive and 
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control system facing bank managers.  Some reforms of the governance structure for bankers have 
been introduced in the UK, for example in the guise of claw-back rules and the senior managers’ 
regime.  But even while the Bank of England has been in the van on this, I believe that much more 
could, and should, be done in this respect. 
 
There are two questions that need reconsideration.  The first relates to the scope of responsibility 
for outcomes in a hierarchical institution; the second relates to the downside that those responsible 
should face when failure or bad behaviour occurs.  When bad behaviour occurs at a lower level, e.g. 
traders conspiring to rig Libor, or junior employees mis-selling products onto uninformed customers, 
should managers, directors and CEOs be able to shelter behind the fact that they did not know what 
was going on?  Should they, could they, have taken steps to find out?  There is surely a case for 
reversing the burden of proof.  Each manager should be held responsible, and subject to suit, unless 
they can demonstrate that they took all reasonable measures to oversee and to constrain the 
actions of their juniors.  The New Zealand procedure of requiring all Directors to sign an affidavit 
stating that they have checked and approved all internal control mechanisms could be adopted. 
 
Similarly the personal liability of shareholders could be related to their informational advantage and 
capacity to influence decisions.  Junior employees and outside shareholders, up to a holding of  X% 
of market value, would keep limited liability.  Junior managers, and large shareholders, could have 
double liability; senior managers, perhaps, treble liability, and CEOs perhaps unlimited liability.   
 
We would be told that such measures would make banks unduly risk averse and prevent qualified 
bank managers going into the profession.  Where is the evidence for that?  Banking worked on the 
basis of unlimited liability up to the second half of the 19th Century, and banks then took plenty of 
risks.   
 
Having argued that the desideratum for financial regulation should have been to reform the 
incentive structure, I consider four areas of current and recent banking reforms where failure to 
consider the incentive and informational structure adequately has weakened their efficiency. 
1. Higher Required Capital Ratios 
 
Left to themselves, bankers will meet higher Capital Adequacy Ratios by deleveraging and 
withdrawing from low profit, possibly safer but capital intensive business.  This will have adverse 
effects on economic recovery and capital markets.   
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The need is to impose incentives on bankers, and shareholders, to restore the level of equity (or to 
redeem a prior public sector injection of equity) to a desired quantum, by preventing any share buy-
backs, dividend payment or increase in managerial compensation until that quantum (n.b. not ratio) 
was reached.  This was done in the USA with the TARP.  On the whole, it was not done in continental 
Europe.  So banking recovery has been weaker in the latter. 
 
2. Bail-in 
Outsiders, even large bond-holders, remain at a serious informational disadvantage and so they are 
unlikely to be able to constrain the riskier actions of management to a significant degree.  If such 
informational asymmetry is recognized by providing protection for all small bond-holders, with a 
holding of less than X in value, then all large institutional investors will maintain a holding of 
precisely X-1 in all such bail-inable bonds. 
 
Whereas the principle, that bond-holders should not be (completely) rescued by a transfer from 
taxpayers is sound, the idea that such bail-in can fully replace a public-sector bail-out in the face of a 
severe systemic shock is unduly optimistic.  Avgouleas and Goodhart (2015) argue that history shows 
that when a bank’s difficulties reflect broader macro problems rather than bank-specific issues, 
imposing haircuts on creditors of one bank is likely to accelerate panic and risks contagion to other 
institutions, which may require public funds to shore up the system as a whole. Indeed, the extent of 
penalty to be imposed on bail-inable bond holders in the European Union (8% of a bank’s liabilities, 
including own funds) before any public support becomes available, is so great that the failure of one 
bank, unless for totally idiosyncratic reasons, is likely to lead to a widespread collapse of the bank 
bond market as a whole, at least for a time, with implications for contagion.   
 
Moreover, a bank resolved by bail-in may have had its equity base restored, but will nevertheless be 
clearly weaker than it will have appeared before,  with the likely consequence that it will face a 
major outflow of deposits, such as occurred in the aftermath of the rescue of Continental Illinois in 
1984, (see Carlson and Rosa, 2016).  The injection of public sector capital under bail-out will be 
replaced by the injection of public sector liquidity from the Central Bank (or in the USA from the 
Treasury) under bail-in, which could put them in the political firing line. 
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3. Structural Reform 
Although losses for retail depositors and failures of payment mechanisms were conspicuous by their 
absence in the recent crisis, this was largely due to the policy of bail-out.  If bail-out is to be cut back, 
perhaps further safeguards need to be introduced to maintain ‘essential’ banking activities.  One set 
of suggestions is to impose constraints on the structure of banking, to make banks smaller, or less 
complex. The proposals of Vickers, Volcker and Liikanen come to mind. 
 
But so long as bankers have an incentive to assume more risk, then they will try to work around such 
structural changes.  If, instead, incentive structures were changed to impose appropriate penalties 
for failure on the banker, then bankers would themselves choose whatever structure, perhaps 
smaller and simpler, would provide them with an acceptably reduced chance of failure.  Historically, 
unlimited liability for bank shareholders was abolished principally to allow larger banks capable of 
financing big business (and big government) to emerge.  If the current concern is that banks have 
become too big and too complex to manage, or to allow to fail, why not just raise the managerial 
penalty for failure?   
 
Managers on the spot will have a better idea of what they can safely undertake, than illustrious 
independent outsiders. Leaving the current incentive system unchanged, while seeking to enforce 
structural change by diktat will have bank management, and their skilled professional advisers, 
seeking loop-holes.   
 
4. Fines for Bad Behaviour 
The current practice of imposing massive fines on banks for the prior misbehaviour of some of their 
(prior) employees is monstrously unfair and inefficient.  It is unfair because it primarily hits 
shareholders, who had no direct responsibility, bank clients, since the bank involved has to cut back 
and raise profit margins to meet impaired capital adequacy, and the economy as a whole because 
such fines represent a massive head-wind against bank participation in the economy.  It is inefficient 
because shareholders can apply little effective pressure on management, and current management 
can generally claim that the misbehaviour occurred under past management, all the while secure in 
the likelihood that by the time current malpractice comes to light, and to adjudication, they too will 
have long been retired from the job and able to claim ignorance of such events, as a splendid letter 
to the FT recently pointed out most lucidly. 
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Regulators should not levy fines on Banks, despite them having the legal status of a person, and 
instead apply the fines to those responsible at the time of the offense, whether subsequently retired 
or not.  As earlier noted, the onus of proof should be on the managers of those who committed the 
misdeed, and so on up the hierarchy, to convince (a jury) that they took all reasonable steps to 
prevent the misdeeds of their subordinates.  The size of fine could be related positively both to the 
extent of negligence and to rank.    
 
Of course, the threat of personal liability and loss could make bankers overly cautious, as is often 
said of US medical practice, with unnecessary and costly tests of patients to reduce the threat of 
suits.  As usual, there would be an optimum internal degree of liability, but we are currently well 
below it. 
 
If a bank CEO knew that his own family’s fortunes would remain at risk throughout his subsequent 
lifetime for any failure of an employee’s behaviour during his period in office, it would do more to 
improve banking ‘culture’ than any set of sermons and required oaths of good behaviour. The root 
of the problem is the bad behaviour of bankers, not of banks, who are incapable of behaviour, for 
good or ill.   The regulatory framework should be refocused towards reforming incentives. 
 
III. The Structure of Housing Finance needs Reform 
 
Critics of banking, especially of investment banking, have attributed much of the blame for the Great 
Financial Crisis of 2008/9 to the rapid growth of financial derivatives.  This was an easy target, since 
it blamed clever bankers for hood-winking simple people like ourselves; it was all their fault!  But the 
criticism was at best only partially valid; thus the Lehman derivative book was profitable, and the 
AIG imbroglio was as much due to asset concentration (a long-standing source of weakness) as to 
the fact that that concentration was in writing CDS swaps.   
 
More important, this criticism redirected attention away from the main underlying source of banking 
weakness, which was the readjustment of bank assets away from short-term, self-liquefying loans to 
business’ working capital towards property-related lending, especially to home-buyers, in the form 
of long-term, illiquid, mortgages.  Adair Turner, and Moritz Schularick and Alan Taylor, have 
described empirically how this has developed over time.  With such lending growing faster than 
retail (insured) deposits, it has been largely financed by a rapid growth in short-term, runnable, 
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wholesale deposits, with the creditors being both uninsured, informed and sensitive to any tenuous 
threat of danger. 
 
Financing long-term illiquid assets on the basis of flighty short-term wholesale deposits should be 
anathema to anyone (like myself) brought up on Banking School precepts.  Moreover, it was the 
involvement of our banks in such housing finance, especially in the USA, Ireland and Spain, that 
actually triggered the Great Financial Crises.  So why have there been so few calls to reform its 
structure?  Perhaps the would-be reformers and critics realise that housing finance, unlike 
derivatives, is politically sensitive.  Another reason is that the regulators calm themselves with the 
assessment that mortgage debts, especially those with recourse to the mortgagors’ other assets and 
earnings, are repaid whenever possible and have the added margin protection of the downpayment. 
 
Consequently, mortgage finance, except at high LTV ratios, gets beneficial treatment in bank risk-
weighted capital assessments.  But this is short-sighted for two reasons.  First, if mortgagors have to 
scrimp on their expenditures elsewhere to meet their financial liabilities, it will still cause a 
recession, as Mian and Sufi showed.  Second, and more important, the housing market exhibits 
considerable inelasticity and self-amplifying mechanisms. 
 
Some banks, or other financial intermediaries, involved in the housing market, are always going to 
take on too much additional risk in the pursuit of profit.  When a down-turn in the housing market 
occurs, the wholesale market will close to these riskier institutions.  But their attempt to replace the 
lost liquidity by selling mortgages or mortgage-backed securities (MBS) on the open market will only 
drive down the prices of such assets, as will also foreclosures of defaulting mortgagors will drive 
down house prices.  The result will be to weaken asset prices still further leading to a self-amplifying 
downwards spiral. 
 
Currently there has been a revival of interest in narrow-banking, that transactions balances in banks 
should only be backed by completely safe assets.  For reasons that I have expressed elsewhere, I 
think that this goes too far as a generality, (Goodhart, 2015).  But there would be considerable merit 
in applying this proposal with respect to long-term property finance.  Thus, such mortgage finance 
could not be provided by banks, or any similar non-bank intermediary, until long-term, stable 
counterpart liabilities had been put in place.  This should not be too difficult to do.  The structure of 
mortgage finance in Denmark provides a good starting point.   
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This change would, almost certainly, make the provision of housing finance a bit less flexible and a 
bit more expensive.  But it was the migration of such housing finance from specialist institutions to 
mainstream banks in the 1980s that has really put our financial system at risk, not the growth of 
derivative markets nor of investment banks.  Proposed reforms such as the separation of investment 
from retail banking, as per the Vickers Commission, have been aiming at the easier, but incorrect, 
target. 
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